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Three distinct phases occur in the history of management of the Tasmanian scallop industry, corresponding 
with a shift in the industry's locus, from D'Entrecasteaux Channel to the East Coast, and thence to Bass Strait. Each shift 
was prompted by crisis in the industry, and though the result on each occasion was to dramatically increase the scale of 
the ind ustry, the record has been one of ad hoc implementation of ultimately ineffective strategies. Though there are some 
local factors accounting forthis, most are deep-seated and resistant to easy resolution - they have to do with the biology 
of the scallop, with its status as a common property resource, and with the ongoing failure to develop theoretical models 
of fisheries management appropriate to the scallop industry. It seems unlikely that the industry's management problems 
can be easily and quickly solved. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Beginning as a weekend leisure activity for a 
few enterprising Hobart citizens at the turn of the 
century, scallop fishing has developed into a major, 
highly-capitalised industry. It is an industry which 
has been the subject of many controversies in its 
comparatively short history, and these have both 
stemmed from and been fueled by periodic collapses 
of production in the industry. That these collapses 
continue to occur suggests one or both of the 
following: a poor management record and/ or 
chronic problems stemming from the biological 
and resource nature of the scallop. We believe the 
latter to be more significant. Though some lack of 
political will to come to terms with the problems is 
evident, the obstacles to sound management are 
nevertheless formidable, and defy easy resolution. 
It is thus unreasonable to expect too much progress 
too soon. 
In the account which follows, three distinct 
periods are identified, each corresponding with 
industry expansion as focus shifted from depleted 
to major new beds. 
TO 1950'S: INDUSTRY RASED ONTHE 
D'ENTRECASTEAUX CHANNEL 
Europeans did not exploit scallops in a signi-
ficant way until the early 1900's. A Royal Com-
mission into the fisheries of Tasmania in 1883 
deemed the only shellfish worthy of special notice 
to be oysters and mussels (Seal et al. 1883). The 
Commission noted the consumption of scallops in 
the vicinity of the coast, but reported that scallops 
did not find their way to the Hobart market. One 
petitioner to the Commission stated that only 
oysters seemed to be considered of value and in 
demand and that the poor of Tasmania did not 
avail themselves of the possibilities of employment 
in an industry which in England and elsewhere 
provided employment for thousands. There was 
evidence even at this stage of over-exploitation of 
fishing resources, for oysters, once plentiful around 
the coastline, now existed in commercial quantities 
only in the vicinity of Spring Bay (lac. cit.). The 
need for management of the ocean fisheries was 
clearly recognised, and the Commissioners saw 
historical developments in other fishing industries, 
and research into the natural history of fish species 
as two important considerations in the formulation 
of a fisheries management policy. 
Until this time, Tasmania's fisheries had been 
managed by the Salmon Commissioners (see 
table I), appointed in 1861 (Henry 1861), and 
mostly involved with the stocking of Tasmanian 
rivers with salmon or trout via the importation and 
breeding of salmon and trout eggs (Innes 1865). In 
1884 however, in response to the 1883 Royal 
Commission findings, Mr W. Saville-Kent was 
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appointed Superintendent and Inspector of a newly 
created Fisheries Department (table 1). Although 
Saville-Kent (1886) was concerned mostly with the 
problems of the oyster fishery he did comment on 
the general state of the Tasmanian sea fisheries and 
suggested that investment in the fishing industry 
would be worthwhile with "the adoption of newer 
methods and a more extended and systematic plan 
of working the fisheries and disposing of their 
produce." Thus even at this time there was an 
awareness of the need for management in the 
development of the fishing industry. 
Although no significant market existed for 
scallops in the nineteenth century, in the early parts 
of the twentieth century scalloping was undertaken 
from rowing or sailing boats and by using small 
dredges in the vicinity of the Marine Board Ship-
yards and Rose Bay (Fairbridge 1953) and as far 
north as New Town Bay (E. Guiler, pers. comm.). 
Both the commercial scallop Pecten Jumata Tate 
and the doughboy scallop Chlamys asperrimus 
Lamarck were being caught. It seems that the only 
other species of scallop found in Tasmania, the 
queen scallop Equichlamys hifrans Lamarck was 
less common than the other two species, and was 
not mentioned in the earlier reports referred to 
above. By 1905 internal combustion marine engines 
had been introduced and the major technological 
impediment to full-scale exploitation of the scallop 
resource was removed. Though existing scallop 
beds around Hobart had begun to dwindle, dredg-
ing could now move to the entrance of the Derwent 
River, Ralphs Bay and the Channel. The young 
industry was quite buoyant and sufficient quantities 
were being taken to satisfy demand, mostly from 
hotels which provided free scallop counter lunches. 
Until 1893 the Commissioners of Fisheries 
were supported by an annual parliamentary vote, 
but after that year they derived their salaries and 
running costs from the taking of fees levied on 
fishermen (Seager 1908). Apparent over-exploita-
tion of the known scallop beds was already taking 
place. The decline in the number of scallops in the 
vicinity of Hobart led the Commissioner of 
Fisheries, Mr P. Seager, to impose in 1908 the first 
closure, when scalloping in the Derwent was dis-
continued "to allow the beds to recuperate" (Seager 
1908). The Commissioner was petitioned by the 
scallop fishermen on more than one occasion to 
re-open the scallop beds; instead he appointed a 
two-man committee to test the recovery or other-
wise of the bed (Seager 1910). The committee made 
eleven dredge hauls over the Derwent River beds 
and found virtually no young scallops growing on 
the western side of the Derwent, though there was a 
reasonable growth elsewhere. Factors thought to 
be contributing to the poor growth of scallops were 
an increase in the number of Auricula sp. (a 
parasitic protozoan), the increasing silt load in the 
river, the discharge of sewage and an increase in 
algal growth. The committee recommended the re-
opening of the beds to scalloping on the grounds 
"that a thorough cleaning of these beds might effect 
an improvement" (The Mercury 8 July 1910). The 
Commissioner of Fisheries demurred - he did not 
consider the committee's findings justified its con-
clusions and he declined to remove the restrictions, 
but the committee was authorised to make further 
investigations (Seager 1910). In 1912 it was decided 
on the recommendation of the committee to re-
open the Derwent to scalloping, with the following 
restrictions; that scallops could be taken by dredges 
towed by boats propelled by oars only, and the 
person taking the scallops was to pay a licence fee 
of five shillings for each dredge used (Seager 1912). 
When these restrictions were lifted is unclear. 
The scallop fishery was not mentioned in a 
second Royal Commission on Tasmanian Fisheries 
in 1916, indicating that the fishery was still operat-
ing only on a small scale. The Royal Commission 
inquired into the causes of the high price of fish on 
the local market and was critical of the way most 
fisheries were unexploited in Tasmania, stating 
that "no island state has ever yet reached full 
development without the thorough exploitation of 
its fishing resources" (Flynn 1916), an assessment 
hardly justified in the case of scallops which by this 
time had all but disappeared from the major field 
- the Hobart area of the Derwent. In 1918 the 
Commissioner of Fisheries appointed a further 
committee, headed by T. Thompson Flynn, Ralston 
Professor of Biology at the University of Tasmania, 
to continue investigations into the reduction in 
scallop numbers in the Derwent River. Intensive 
dredging over the scallop beds, produced "as many 
full-sized scallops as could be counted on the 
fingers of both hands" (Flynn 1918). In Flynn's first 
report he suggested four possible causes of the 
decline in the scallop popUlation: increased silt and 
mud load in the river, increased numbers of 
parasites, increased numbers of starfish, and 
fluctuations in the water salinity. In his second and 
final report he found that the Derwent was again 
stocked with young scallops and.concluded that 
their previous disappearance had been caused by 
unusual flooding, resulting in an increase in silt 
load in the Derwent and drastic fluctuation in the 
water salinity (Flynn 1919). 
The Commissioner of Fisheries' report for 
the year 1918-19 stated that "the industry of 
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TABLEt 
Evolution of Tasmanian fisheries management structure. 
Management Authority Year Legislation Comments 
Salmon and Freshwater 1861 Government Notice 148 A 6 member commission set up to oversee the 
importation of salmon ova from England. Fisheries Commission 
Superintendent and 1884 
Inspector of Fisheries* 
~ 21 October 1861 
Fisheries Mr W. Saville-Kent was appointed as a result 
of the 1882 Royal Commission on the Fisheries 
of Tasmania. 
Fisheries Board 1887 Government Notice 321 A 23 member Board appointed partly as a 
result of Mr Saville·-Kent's recommendation. ~ 8 November 1887 
Commissioners of 
Fisheries 
Sea Fisheries Board 
Fisheries Division, 
Department of Agriculture 
1889 
1925 
1941 
Fisheries Act, 1889 
Fisheries Act, 1925 
Fisheries Act, 1935 
25 people were appointed as Commissioners of 
Fisheries on 16 December, 1889. 
The Commissioners of Fisheries were split, in 
1925, into the Salmon and Freshwater Fisheries 
Commission and the Sea Fisheries Board which 
comprised 4 members. 
The Division was supervised by the Department 
of Agriculture and headed by Mr R. Scott. 
Fisheries Division, 
Department of Agriculture 
and the Tasmanian 
Fisheries Development 
Authority (T.F.D.A.) 
1977 Fisheries Development 
Act, 1977 
The T.F.D.A. was established on the 
recommendation of the O'Kelly Report, 
commissioned in 1976. 
Department of Sea 
Fisheries 
1985 Fisheries Development 
Repeal Act, 1985 
Fisheries Amendment 
Act, 1985 
A second review by O'Kelly in 1984 
recommended the disbanding of the T.F.D.A. 
and reforming a Sea Fisheries Department. 
* From 1884-1941 the management authority was known as the "Fisheries Department" an appellation which disguises 
the significant changes (including nomenclature changes) outlined above. 
scalloping has now assumed such importance to 
the people that it must be developed and protected" 
(Seager 1919). Despite this recognition however, 
no new management initiatives seem to have been 
set in place. Again the focus of scalloping began to 
shift, from Ralphs Bay and the mouth of the 
Derwent, to the northern half of D'Entrecasteaux 
Channel. The industry expanded slowly. In 1920 
only two scallop boats were engaged full-time in 
the trade; in 1924 several boats were scalloping. 
The increased pressure on the scallop stocks resulted 
in a number of management decisions aimed at 
protecting the stock. A season of six months, from 
April to September, and minimum sizes of three 
and a half inches (85 mm) for the commercial 
scallop and two and a half inches (63.5 mm) for the 
doughboy scallop, were imposed (Brown 1960). 
This virtually ended scalloping in the Derwent 
River and Ralphs Bay and increased the effort in 
the northern parts of D'Entrecasteaux Channel 
and in Northwest Bay. 
In 1925 the government replaced the Com-
missioner of Fisheries with the four member Sea 
Fisheries Board (table I) with the professed aim of 
stimulating development in marine fishing (Ogilvie 
1925). One of its first acts was to close the northern 
beds of the D'Entrecasteaux Channel, apparently 
to prevent over-fishing (Fairbridge 1953, Brown 
1960). It is hard to assess the accuracy of the over-
fishing claim at this time as there were no annual 
reports to parliament by the Sea Fisheries Board 
from 1925 until 1941 ; available data consist only of 
the 1929 to 1939 total scallop catch figures, which 
were collected verbally by the Inspector of Fisheries. 
These demonstrated the comparatively small scale 
of the industry at the beginning of this period, 
though steady and impressive growth occurred 
after 1933 (Harrison 1965). The species-basis of the 
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industry was also changing. Until 1932 larger 
numbers of commercial scallops were taken; after 
this time doughboy scallops were taken in greater 
numbers. Harrison 1965) suggested that the mani-
fest economic advantages of commercial' over 
doughboy scallops can only mean that the com-
mercial scallop was quite rare in the D'Entre-
casteaux Channel during the 1930's. 
As well as closure in 1925 of the Channel for 
two years, other management measures were taken 
in the interests of conserving the resource. In 1928 
the scallop season was reduced by two months, 
whilst the Channel beds were re-opened for fishing, 
only to be closed again in 1930 and 1931. The 
minimum legal size of the commercial scallop was 
changed by the Sea Fisheries Board in 1934 from 
three and a half inches (85 mm) at its largest 
diameter to three and a half inches at its smallest 
diameter. In 1935 dredges were limited to a width 
of four feet (1.2 m) to protect the scallops from 
being crushed by the weight of the net being 
dragged over the bottom. From 1938 until 1942 
there were fluctuations in the total catch of scallops 
due to petrol and manpower shortages during 
World War II: however meat rationing increased 
the demand for scallops and resulted in stepped-up 
fishing effort, facilitated by the extension of the 
scallop season by two w(ieks. 
An important change in industry management 
at this time was the transfer, in June 1941, of the 
functions and responsibilities of the Sea Fisheries 
Board to the Minister for Agriculture (table 1). An 
Advisory Board was constituted, consisting of the 
Secretary for Agriculture, Secretary of the Police 
Department, a zoologist, a fish processor, and two 
fishermen representing the south and east coasts 
(Smith 1942). Annual reports of the Board were 
published as part of the Agriculture Department's 
reports. 
The Channel scallop industry continued to 
increase production through the 1940's, but in 1949 
catches decreased markedly, indicating that almost 
fifty years into its history, little progress had been 
made in effective regulation of the resource. From 
the foregoing it will be apparent that little con-
sistency or sophistication characterised attempts to 
manage the resource in this early phase. Though 
the means adopted - restrictions on permissible 
technique, limitations, via licence, on open access 
to the resource, and temporary bed closure -
remain the major regulatory tools to the present, 
little progress was made toward understanding the 
nature of the resource or monitoring population 
changes. Assessment was not continuous but 
occurred only when serious drops in the scallop 
population had become obvious. Subsequent 
restrictions were thus never in time to protect the 
industry in the short term, though sufficient to 
permit recovery in the intermediate term. 
1950'S-1973: INDUSTRY BASED ON 
THE EAST COAST BEDS 
The poor catches of the late 1940's continued 
into the early 1950's. A.M. Olsen, Senior Research 
Officer with the CSIRO Division of Fisheries, 
carried out research in the 1950's aimed at explain-
ing the decline in Channel scallop numbers. He 
found the minimum concentration of scallops for 
economic fishing to be two per square yard (approx. 
one square metre) and established that the scallops 
were preyed upon by the large whelk or band shell 
Fascialaria australasia Perry and by the eleven-
armed starfish Cascinasterias calamaria Gray. 
Olsen (1955) contended that concern expressed 
about the reduction in scallop numbers in the 
D'Entrecasteaux Channel may have been mis-
guided: 
It is well recognized that fishing never exter-
minates a stock but reduces the stock to 
individuals of minimum legal size and/ or an 
uneconomic level of operation. Therefore so 
long as there is an ample breeding stock of those 
below the minimum legal size, any proposal 
restricting areas of dredging is preventing the 
rational exploitation of a fishable stock. 
Olsen's controversial position set one of the 
boundaries to the appropriate management re-
sponse to population shortfall debate which 
continues to this day. 
Despite the attention still being acccorded 
the Channel, it was shortly to be eclipsed as 
Tasmania's prime bed. Increasingly the industry 
began to explore and exploit beds on the east coast 
of Tasmania, and the late 1950's was a period of 
industry expansion. 
In 1960 a Select Committee of the Legislative 
Council was appointed to inquire into the scallop 
fishery. The enquiry was initiated by the controversy 
surrounding the introduction of a new spike-
toothed dredge, the "sputnik" dredge. Apparent 
damage to the scallop beds prompted submissions 
from 45 fishermen, an indication of considerable 
concern. Other issues raised by the fishermen 
included perceived inadequate management by the 
Fisheries Division, and in particular the lack of 
research into scallop behaviour and that of its 
major predator, the starfish (Prince et al. 1960). 
This constitutes the first clear evidence of a rift 
between regulator and client. It reflects the inherent 
Tasmanian Scallop Industry: Problems of Management 5 
and persistent difficulties of scallop management 
alluded to earlier: one would expect these to lead to 
friction and impatience between industry and 
management, and the wonder of it rather is that 
clear evidence of this dissatisfaction has not been 
found in earlier periods. It may also be a measure of 
the greatly increased professionalisation and 
technological sophistication of the industry from 
the 1950's. 
The select Committee brought down an 
Interim Report which made a number of manage-
ment recommendations. Many of these aimed at 
overcoming research and monitoring deficiencies 
characteristic of the industry hitherto. These 
included the appointment, for the first time, of 
research staff specifically to investigate scallops 
(or, more accurately, to give scallop research 
priority amongst other research tasks), and investi-
gation of the scallop beds. Nevertheless, most 
recommendations involved expansion and sophis-
tication of existing techniques aimed at guarantee-
ing the resource against over-exploitation: increas-
ing the number of fisheries inspectors, increasing 
fines for breaches offisheries regulations, register-
ing sheds where scallops were split, shortening the 
scallop season by two weeks, prohibiting night 
fishing, restricting the issue of scallop licenses, re-
introducing separate licences for scallop fishing 
(including special endorsements for the Channel 
area and Norfolk Bay beds), taking a substantial 
fee to provide a worthwhile contribution to the 
administration of the Sea Fisheries Board, and 
undertaking a program to control starfish numbers 
(Brown 1960). The emphasis in the above recom-
mendations on tightening the Board's policing 
effectiveness highlights the Select Committee's 
belief that a major reason for earlier management 
failure was incapacity to enforce adequately the 
measures taken, rather than inappropriateness of 
the measures themselves. 
After research into the effects of different 
types of dredges on scallop beds the Committee 
submitted a second report in 1961 which recom-
mended that the lip dredge and lip dredge with 
runners be permitted; that restrictions on dredge 
type only apply to the D'Entrecasteaux Channel; 
that a fisherman education program begin; and 
that Tasmanian scallop processors market their 
scallops so that they be clearly and attractively 
identified as Tasmanian (Brown 1961). Little good 
seems to have come from these recommendations; 
the lip dredge with runners proved unsuccessful, no 
effective program aimed at fisherman education 
was set up, and there was no apparent increase in 
marketing Tasmanian scallops as Tasmanian. 
The success of the more important recom-
mendations in the Interim Report was also mixed. 
Research into scallop dredge design was under-
taken, night fishing was prohibited in the Channel, 
a temporary reduction ofthe season was instituted, 
and scallop sheds were registered with the Depart-
ment of Health. Other recommendations were 
either not adopted or proved ineffective. For 
instance, there was no restriction on the issue of 
scallop licences, and no substantial fee was taken to 
contribute to the administration of the Board, 
whilst an increase in fines for breaches of fisheries 
regulations was instituted, but to no good effect, as 
magistrates tended habitually to impose only the 
minimum fine. 
The disappointing fate of the Select Com-
mittee's recommendations reflects the management 
difficulties posed by scallop utilization, and the 
mix of incapacity and unwillingness to tackle with 
determination these difficulties on the part of 
management. It lends credence to the feelings of 
some fishermen that the government lacked the will 
to apply the recommendations stemming from the 
Select Committee enquiry. The Channel scallop 
beds were partly closed again in 1964 as a result of 
over-fishing, and incentives were thereafter given 
to fishermen by the Sea Fisheries Advisory Board 
to locate new scallop beds to maintain the fishery. 
The incentives took the form of temporary exclusive 
rights of access to a newly discovered scallop bed. 
By the late 1960's the east coast beds were also 
becoming severely depleted, further highlighting 
the failure of the State's management strategy. The 
late 1960's were years of low spatfall, and at this 
time Tasmania had to confront serious interstate 
competition for the first time. Although Victoria's 
scallop industry only came into being in the early 
1960's (as a result of exploration by Tasmanian 
fishermen), by 1970 it had supplanted Tasmania as 
Australia's leading scallop producer (Sanders 1970). 
The constitutional problems the industry exper-
iences today date from this time. 
Yet again the industry was in a state of crisis, 
and in danger of collapsing under the twin weights 
of years of poor recruitment and vigorous interstate 
competition. Again crisis forced the industry into a 
new phase, as management responded in the same 
way as it had done in the 1950's; it launched a 
campaign to discover exploitable new beds. Much 
of the initiative to find new scallop beds was 
undertaken by the Sea Fisheries Division of the 
Department of Agriculture, which surveyed 800 
square miles (approx. 200,000 hectares) of Bass 
Strait for scallop beds in 1972. This search revealed 
four areas with high densities. The depletion of the 
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scallop stocks in the Derwent River and Ralphs 
Bay, the Channel and finally the east coast led the 
Minister for Agriculture, Mr L. Costello, to release 
policy statement regarding the likely exploitation 
of the Bass Strait scallop beds. According to Mr 
Costello "a slower rate of exploitation by smaller, 
lighter dredges was considered to be more desirable 
than an uncontrolled quick decimation of the 
stock"(The Mercury 6 June 1973). A determination 
not to re-commit the errors of the past seemed 
evident. Nevertheless, occasionally remnants of old 
ways of thinking remained in evidence, such as Mr 
Costello's threat on 13 June 1973 that unless local 
interest in the newly opened Bass Strait beds 
quickened, he would throw those beds open to 
Victorian fishermen, as "he was not prepared to see 
a valuable food resource 'wasted'" (The Mercury 
14 June 1973). Such a statement reads almost 
incredibly in light of current interstate tension over 
exploitation of what has, in turn, proven a finite 
fishing resource, and leads one to question how 
deeply embedded, in 1973, was the apparent new-
found determination to husband the resource wisely 
and to adopt a more responsible approach to 
management. 
1973-PRESENT: INDUSTRY BASED 
ON BASS STRAIT BEDS 
This period has seen not only a shift in the 
geographical locus of the industry - it is also 
characterized by a greatly stepped-up research 
emphasis, at least by comparison with the industry's 
earlier phases. Since 1973, for instance, the Sea 
Fisheries Division of the Department of Agriculture 
has been conducting biological studies into the life 
history of the scallop with the aim of assessing the 
potential for scallop aquaculture, which would 
involve the growing of young scallops artificially 
and then releasing them into depleted natural areas 
(Dix 1975). 
In 1976 the Tasmanian government commis-
sioned a report on the fishing industry by the 
Chairman of the Irish Sea Fisheries Board, Mr 
B. H. O'Kelly. That report found that further 
development was hindered by the "existing admin-
istrative structure", in that the Fisheries Division, a 
small group within the Department of Agriculture, 
could not manage effectively because of the need to 
live with wider departmental priorities, and other 
problems relating to the inertia and unwieldiness 
often characteristic oflarge bureaucracies. O'Kelly 
recommended the establishment of a Sea Fisheries 
Development Authority charged with specific 
responsibility for the development of the industry. 
The government endorsed the report and estab-
lished the Authority under the Fisheries Develop-
ment Act which came into effect in September 1977 
(table 1). Though the Sea Fisheries Division 
remained, the Tasmanian Fisheries Development 
Authority (TFDA), consisting of a chairman (the 
manager of the Agricultural Bank of Tasmania) 
and four other government appointees, commenced 
operation later that year, with three aims: to 
promote and develop the fishing industry; to 
maintain standards of exports and local products; 
and to research the management of living resources 
(Shoobridge 1979). One of the Authority's first acts 
was to expand the earlier work on scallop 
aquaculture. 
Scallop fishing in Bass Strait introduced a 
new set of management problems. Questions of 
Federal-State jurisdiction over coastal waters 
became apparent in the 1970's and remained long 
unresolved. Until June 1986, Tasmanian authorities 
had control over the waters up to 3 nautical miles 
(approx. 5.6 km) from the coastline, while the 
Federal authorities controlled the 3 to 200 nautical 
mile Exclusive Fishing Zone. This led to competi-
tion between Victorian and Tasmanian scallop 
boats with the potential result of over-fishing and 
economic hardship for some scallopers, and a 
possible spillover of excess fishermen into other 
fisheries such as the crayfish and shark fisheries. In 
1979 Tasmanian fishermen took their concern to 
government and the then Minister for Sea Fisheries, 
Dr J. Amos, called for a division of Bass Strait 
along the 39° 12'S parallel, a simple enough claim 
which gives no hint of the formidable constitutional 
and political difficulties standing in the way of such 
a course of action. Predictably, no action ensued at 
that time and subsequent slow progress toward 
reaching the Off-shore Constitutional Settlement 
highlights these difficulties. Lack of progress toward 
putting the Settlement in place was locally ascribed 
to intransigence on the part of the Victorian 
Government, which was reluctant to have its 
industry's access to Tasmanian waters removed, 
this being the effect of a related but separately 
wrought agreement whereby exclusive rights to fish 
to 20 nautical miles (approx. 37 km) from the coast 
devolve to Tasmania. 
The controversy surrounding the manage-
ment of the scallop beds resulted, in November 
1983, in a joint Commonwealth-Victorian-Tas-
manian moratorium on the issue of scallop licences 
to fish in Bass Strait until the end of 1984 (the 
"interim Management Regime"), to give the 
Commonwealth time to evaluate a comprehensive 
long-term management plan for this area. The 
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moratorium was designed to limit the entry of 
boats to the Bass Strait fishery as a means of 
controlling the build-up of fishing capacity. Eligi-
bility for a licence was based on a demonstrated 
commitment to the fishery which could be shown in 
a number of ways, such as by proving that a boat 
had fished in the area during the previous season, 
by having commenced to build a boat for scalloping, 
or by holding a licence to fish for scallops in the 
coastal waters of Victoria. A second major inter-
governmental initiative for the Bass Strait scallop 
fishery, the Bass Strait Scallop Fishery Task Force, 
consisting of officials from the Commonwealth, 
Tasmanian and Victorian fisheries authorities and 
from the industry, was established in June 1984 to 
prepare a report on options for future management 
of the fishery for consideration by the relevant 
governments. In July 1985 the relevant State and 
Commonwealth Ministers announced details of a 
new management regime, involving the phased 
handing over of responsibility for the fishery to 
Victoria and Tasmania (after each State had pro-
vided a management plan for its zone). This was 
enabled by the decision of the Commonwealth to 
implement the Fisheries component of the Offshore 
Constitutional Settlement, and means that the 
fishery can eventually be controlled under a single 
law. Under the scheme, three fisheries were created 
-- one controlled by each of the States to 20 
nautical miles offshore, and a third under joint 
Tasmanian-Victorian control. After much delay 
this came into effect in June 1986. 
Of recent years there has been some recovery 
in Tasmania's depleted beds. The D'Entrecasteaux 
Channel scallop fishery was again opened, after 15 
years closure, to commercial and amateur fishermen 
in 1982. Severe restrictions were imposed. Com-
mercial scallops could not be taken at all after the 
1983 season, bag limits were introduced, and the 
scalloping season was set at three weeks. There 
was, however, no restriction on the numbers of 
boats allowed to fish and in 1983,666 recreational 
boats and 70 commercial boats were working the 
beds. In 1984 the daily bag limit for amateurs was 
reduced from one bag containing up to 1000 
scallops to one bag containing 400 scallops and for 
professional fishermen from 15 bags containing a 
total of 15000 scallops to 20 bags containing a total 
of 8000 scallops. 
Changes also continue to occur in the struc-
ture of industry management. In February 1985 the 
TFDA and Sea Fisheries Division became incor-
porated in the Department of Sea Fisheries (table 1) 
whilst the Fisheries inspectors were incorporated 
into the Police Force. There are also indications 
that the research effort of the last decade is starting 
to yield results. It was announced, for instance (The 
Mercury 25 January 1986), that the Department of 
Sea Fisheries had achieved a "major breakthrough" 
in the "re-establishment of over-fished scallop 
beds", involving "the transplanting of scallops 
from controlled breeding grounds to the seabed ", a 
process whereby scallops are able to reach legal size 
"in as little as 17 months" instead of the normal two 
to three years. 
That management continued to find resolu-
tion of the industry's long-standing problems 
difficult however, is evinced by the media-grabbing 
turmoil which reigned in the industry through 
J 985. At one stage violent clashes between Victorian 
and Tasmanian fishermen seemed imminent, and 
there was talk of new beds being fished out within 
days of discovery, of excessive catches going to rot, 
of splits in the ranks of the Tasmanian Scallop 
Fishermen's Association, and a general increase in 
fishermen militancy. The Mercury was in no doubt 
about the continued failure of management to 
regulate the industry effectively. It editorialised (21 
October 1985): "Every time a new bed is discovered, 
it is virtually fished to exhaustion as fishermen 
flock in to reap a benefit from a bonanza they know 
from past experience will have a limited life." 
LESSONS FROM HISTORY 
From a management perspective, the most 
striking aspect of this history is that, from its 
beginnings to the present, problems and manage-
ment responses have remained little changed -
though considerable experimentation with admin-
istrative structures and arrangement has taken 
place. The industry's major beds have been subject 
to spectacular and largely unpredicted falls in 
popUlation, and no mechanisms has been found to 
control fishing effort in such a way as to stabilize 
the industry both ecologically and economically. In 
the past crises have been averted by the discovery 
and opening up of new beds, but this option is 
probably no longer available in any major sense, 
whilst the increase in fishing capacity in the wake of 
significant technological innovations since the 
1950's now provides the means to overfish such 
new beds as are located in an extremely short 
period of time. Pressure on management has thus 
increased commensurate with fishing capacity. 
It is beyond the scope of this paper to 
prescribe management solutions. This has become 
a major government priority, and it is also the focus 
of academic investigation elsewhere. We intend 
merely to account for the management record 
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outlined above. Some of the difficulties can be 
attributed to inadequate resources and a lack of 
political will on the part of the authorities. Instances 
of this can be intelligently guessed at from the 
account given above. But it is also nepessary to 
identify the chronic and possibly greater difficulties 
which are inherent in scallop management. To 
these we now turn. 
FACTORS CONDUCIVE TO 
MANAGEMENT FAILURE 
Scallop Biology 
The problems posed by the biological nature 
of the resource have been well identified elsewhere 
(Harrison 1965, 1975, St Leger 1964, Dix 1981, 
Hortle 1983) and will be only briefly surveyed here. 
They are, however, formidable. Harrison (1975) 
has noted the "apparent sensitivity of the recruit-
ment process to environmental conditions", 
whereby "we have a population behaviour pattern 
perhaps more akin to that of plague insects such as 
locusts than fish". Annual fluctuation in the spatfall 
success rate of all species of Tasmanian scallop is 
enormous. This is not peculiar to Tasmania - it 
has been reported from nearly all scallop fisheries, 
both in Australia and elsewhere. The causes of 
these fluctuations are still unknown, but their 
importance to the health ofthe fishery is undoubted. 
The number of larvae settling in one year will 
determine the availability of stock for the fishery in 
approximately three years time. Fishermen who 
exploit an area of scallop beds in one year are not 
necessarily guaranteed a sucessful consecutive year 
owing to this variability of spatfall. This factor may 
underlie the major collapses which have occurred 
in the scallop fishery since exploitation began. 
Thus an accurate assessment of the spatfall success 
is crucial to good management procedures. In 
addition, little is thus far known of the scallop's 
susceptibility to disease. 
The Failure of 
Theoretical Models 
As with other fishing industries, scallop 
management suffers from the failure to develop the 
appropriate theoretical models to obviate the 
necessity of reinventing the wheel every time a 
management strategy must be devised. There are 
three competing paradigms of fishery exploitation: 
Maximum Sustainable Yield (MSY), Maximum 
Economic Yield (MEY), and Optimum Sustainable 
Yield (OSY). We contend that all have proven of 
limited practical use. 
The MSY concept has underwritten most 
fishing management policies in the past fifty years 
or so (Larkin 1977). It first arose as a management 
concept in the early twentieth century in the 
Norwegian whaling industry. Using information 
they had collected on fin and blue whales from the 
Antarctic and off the Icelandic coast, the N or-
wegians discussed the relationship between regen-
eration and catch of whales in the hope of finding a 
mathematical model to help them establish the 
minimum stock of whales which could yield a given 
catch without exterminating the stock. They found 
that in the case of whales the data base was not 
sufficient to afford an adequate foundation for a 
calculation: however they did suggest that there is a 
definite level to which the whale stock can be 
reduced, while preserving the maximum capacity 
of regeneration and at the same time securing an 
optimum catch. Others (Ricker 1948, 1958, Fry 
1947, Schaefer 1954, Beverton & Holt 1957) further 
refined the concept, and it became the standard 
strategy for fisheries management, in Australia, as 
elsewhere. Larkin (1977) provides a jaundiced 
definition: "any species each year produces a 
harvestable surplus, and if you take that much, and 
no more, you can go on getting it for ever and ever". 
[he theoretical validity of MS Y has been 
demonstrated under laboratory conditions, but 
attempts to use MSY as the sole management tool 
in the field have met with severe problems, leading 
one fisheries scientist to state that "the generalised 
concept ofMSY is elegant in both its simplicity and 
its adherence to the basic theories of the behaviour 
of the population. The problem is that as applied it 
is totally unsound." (Talbot 1978). 
What then are the major problems confront-
ing the fisheries manager who attempts to use MSY 
as the major management objective? The most 
fundamental problem is the difficulty of observing 
and accurately measuring the relevant dynamics of 
any living marine resource. This is due in part to the 
technical problems of data collection in the marine 
environment but also to the heavy costs associated 
with sampling and processing data. The most 
extensive sampling programme of the fishing 
resource is undertaken by the fishermen themselves; 
however their figures are never completely free of 
reporting biases, for the fishermen have an eco-
nomic disincentive to divulge such fishing catch 
data as locality and abundance of fish stocks for 
fear of advantaging their fishing competitors, whilst 
there is also in many cases a lack of scientific 
method and accuracy in recording results. In the 
Tasmanian scallop industry estimates of scallop 
numbers are made by making a number of dredge 
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hauls over known scallop beds (Zacharin 1985). 
This system allows an estimate of the capabilities of 
the beds to support a fishery in any given year but 
because of the extremely variable recruitment of 
the scallop, it would only provide a tenuous basis 
for an MSY prediction. 
A second problem concerns the failure of the 
MSY concept to deal with multispecies fisheries, as 
it was derived to predict the yield of one species or 
race only. For example, in the Pacific Northwest 
salmon fishery it has been found that the salmon 
population consists of races with different growth 
rates, recruitment, and mortality, and thus, dif-
ferent yield functions. They can however be caught 
together in the one net. An MSY estimate in this 
case ideally should be made for each race (Ricker 
1973). The Tasmanian scallop fishery sometimes 
involves the dredging of more than one species of 
scallop as well as an assortment of other species of 
fish, invertebrates and algae. At present these other 
species have no commercial value (it is possible that 
some of them may eventully be utilized as food 
sources, or as fertilizer), though their value to the 
marine ecosystem, as yet unknown, could be 
considerable. The harvesting of trophically linked 
species can also drastically reduce the MSY for a 
living resource. In the case of the scallop, which is a 
plankton feeder, no apparent problem exists as 
plankton is not harvested in Tasmania. For a 
scallop management regime to be successfully 
implemented, there should be a calculation of the 
MSY for each species/ race being fished. This 
would lead to much effort and expense for the 
fisheries authorities and also to frustration for 
fishermen who would have to sort, count and 
itemise their catch. 
For most species of fish, the critical age for 
harvesting is close to the first age of maturity when 
growth in weight is rapid and natural mortality is 
low. Scallops are no exception to this general rule 
(Gwyther et al. 1984). Thus the reproductive portion 
of an exploited population would normally be 
made up of young adults. In the event of a natural 
catastrophe (such as unseasonally warm or cold 
water) which killed most fish, the ability of the 
popUlation to recover is impaired by the lack of 
mature fish. As scallops are known to have dramatic 
fluctuations in their annual numbers an MSY 
prediction could only be made at best on a year to 
year basis and the dangers associated with an over-
estimation would be acute. 
Although MSY contains these inadequacies 
it would be unwise to discard the concept entirely. 
If there is a demand from society for the utilization 
and conservation of a resource then MSY would 
appear to form the upper limit of exploitation 
which would ensure the survival of the species 
against excessive fishing mortality. This all makes 
sense in a strictly biological framework, but fisheries 
managers must contend with more than just bio-
logical factors. In particular they must also consider 
the welfare of the industry participants. Other 
management concepts have been embraced in 
recent times which have resulted in a shift from 
management along strictly biological lines towards 
the economic management of fisheries. Hence the 
development of Maximum Economic Yield, a 
concept which modifies the biologists' MSY model 
to derive a cost/ revenue curve by transposing yield 
to its revenue equivalent. By highlighting the low 
return for effort involved at the margins of MSY, 
MEY tends - in theory -- to establish exploitation 
levels at a lower total fishing effort than MSY, and 
might therefore be expected to provide greater 
protection of the resource from the dangers of 
overfishing. 
Again, however, there are problems which 
limit its practical applicability. The first problem, 
and one which is particularly relevant to the 
Tasmanian scallop fishery, arises from the com-
peting interests of commercial and recreational 
fishermen. Commercial fishermen usually wish to 
exploit a resource to maximize their profits while 
recreational fisherman normally attempt to maxi-
mize their pleasure, of which only a portion may be 
financial return. The commercial fishermen's aims 
are not contradicted by the concept of MEY when 
their combined total effort can be controlled; but 
pleasure for recreational fishermen may mean such 
intangibles as the escape from suburbanism, aes-
thetic value of fishing, or hunting instinct release, 
which will not translate into a computation of 
MEY. This quandary faces the fisheries managers 
in the Tasmanian scallop fishery, and an MEY 
concept in this context would have little value in 
helping to formulate ajoint recreational/ commer-
cial fishery management plan. 
The second problem with managing a fishery 
along MEY lines stems from the common property 
nature of the fishing resource, to be discussed 
below. Fishermen, like other businessmen, seek to 
maximize their profits. In a situation where there 
are no external controls on the number of boats, 
capital will pour into the industry while fishermen 
perceive the chance of profits until the profit 
margin finally dissipates. The late entrants into a 
fishery will sink capital which, because of reduced 
stocks and increased total fishing effort, will result 
in the fishery becoming over-capitalised. Thus in 
an unregulated fishery the MEY inevitably will be 
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surpassed, leading to a need for external interven-
tion to reduce fishing effort. In the Bass Strait 
scallop fishery there has been a limit on the number 
of licences issued to fish for scallops, though catch 
quotas appear to be the favoured option for the 
fishery's long-term management (B. Lilburn, 
Chairman, Bass Strait Scallop Fishery Task Force, 
pers. comm.). This restriction of effort, while 
having the admirable aim of protecting the resource 
and increasing profits for participants, is plagued 
by distributional inequities. The problem of who 
should get a licence, for instance, is a most vexing 
one, and fraught with political and ethical problems. 
Thirdly, MEY can only be accurately plotted 
if the price remains constant. But the price of 
Tasmanian scallops varies within the State and in 
other States, depending on demand and supply at 
different times of the year and on the variable costs 
associated with the different markets to which they 
are sent. The assumption that fishing vessels, their 
catch effectiveness and their operating costs are 
roughly comparable is also invalid, for fishing is 
undertaken by a variety of sizes of boats with 
varying operating costs and catch effectiveness. In 
addition, as with MSY the data base required to 
make an assessment of MEY for the Tasmanian 
scallop fishery would be extremely difficult to 
obtain, due, again, to the reluctance of some 
fisherman to divulge the information, the need to 
update constantly cost and price data, and the costs 
of gathering and processing the information. An 
accurate assessment of MEY is thus unlikely. 
Finally the effects of improvements in fishing 
technology on the level of effort and economic 
efficiency further upset any attempts to manage a 
fishery in accordance with MEY. In a situation 
where technological improvements are unregulated, 
fishing effort can rapidly escalate beyond the 
MEY; however, where they are regulated, account 
must be made of the economic inefficiencies created 
by such a policy and the associated problems 
(Whitmarsh 1983). In the scallop fishery there have 
been a number of technological innovations such 
as changes in dredge size and efficiency, improve-
ments in boat performance, and the recent intro-
duction of scallop sorting machines to reduce 
handling time for fishermen. This last innovation 
has been examined carefully by the Bass Strait 
Scallop Fishery Task Force to assess its likely 
affect on scallop numbers. If it is too efficient, that 
is, if it creates the potential for rapid increases in 
fishing effort, its use will be restricted - an 
apposite example of regulated economic ineffi-
ciency which prevents a true MEY being taken. 
With all these problems is there any value in 
attempting to manage a fishery on the basis of 
MEY? It would seem to be inappropriate for the 
Tasmanian scallop fishery in light of the above. 
However the MEY model does allow administrators 
to point out the dangers of excess effort and the 
importance of the problems posed by common 
property rights. 
A third management paradigm is Optimum 
Sustainable Yield, a concept which arose from the 
1958 Oceans Convention in Geneva (Stroud 1975). 
Unlike MSY and MEY it provides no models with 
which to structure practical data theoretically, and 
its flexibility has led to much criticism (Harville 
1975). Who, for instance, is to define "optimum'''? 
Croker (1975) argued that inevitably persons with 
the most political clout will be the final arbiters of 
what is optimal. Nor is there agreement about what 
OSY precisely is; it is usually defined vaguely in 
terms of MSY or MEY, with some social impact 
considerations like employment effects or regional 
social hardships tacked on. At the Australian 
Fisheries Conference held in Canberra in 1984 
three issues were identified in the development of 
fisheries management plans. These were conserva-
tion of resources, economics of the industry and the 
social implications of any initiatives. If these three 
criteria are considered as the basis of an OSY 
programme, the OSY for scallop fisheries managers 
might be the fishing effort at which yield is below 
scallop recruitment level while still safely allowing 
a limited season for fishermen to work. In the latter 
requirement determination ofthe 'limited season' is 
obviously crucial. If the season is too long the 
problems outlined in the MSY and MEY sections 
will be encountered. If it is too short fisheries 
managers will be exposed to criticism for 'locking 
up' the resource. If restrictions were placed on the 
number of fishermen entering the fishery then some 
control on the fishing effort would be possible; 
however this will inevitably result in distributional 
inequities, as noted above. In addition, most 
commercial fishermen would probably interpret 
the OSY as being somewhat higher than the 
authority'S interpretation, due to their capital 
outlay and desire to maximise their return on 
effort. OSY variables for recreational fishermen 
will differ again, for as we have seen, 'un quanti-
fiables' such as the quality of derived pleasure are 
significant in their case. 
It would thus seem that OSY is of limited 
applicability for the Tasmanian scallop fishery. In 
a wider sense OSY does attempt to fill the gaps left 
by the failure of MSY and MEY to address such 
problems as the sociological effects of management 
plans on, for example, employment and regional 
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hardships, but it clearly requires much greater 
refinement before it can be considered as an 
appropriate theoretical construct for the shaping of 
regulatory practice. 
Common Property Rights 
A number of other prcblems are endemic to 
management of the scallop industry. The constitu-
tional and political difficulties involved in Bass 
Strait will not be easily solved and may periodically 
recur. Problems of technological advance are not 
only relevant to attempts to evaluate MEY: what-
ever management strategies are adopted the 
potential for innovation to inflict consequential 
damage upon the industry will remain a problem. 
There are also problems of political will. There will 
always be a tendency on the part of fishermen to 
maximize income in the short term and trust the 
long-term to look after itself (Berkes 1985). This 
will bring them into conflict with government and 
management, and in neither case can we assume 
that the will to resist fishermen's demands will 
necessarily exist. Politicians are susceptible to 
pressure from organized, articulate private interests. 
Administrators have a tendency to avoid the stress 
associated with an adversarial management rela-
tionship with clients by taking on the world view of 
those clients; a process known as 'clientism', 
whereby the steward of the public interest ceases to 
be such, and becomes instead the public sector 
facilitator of private interests. 
How can we account for this divergence 
between public and private interest? The answer 
lies in the common property nature of many 
resources, including scallops. Here, too, much has 
already been written (Gordon 1954, Crutchfield & 
Pontecorvo 1969, Harrison 1975, Copes 1981, 
Welch 1983). It has long been recognized that the 
world's fishery crises stem from "the fact that these 
fisheries are common property resources to which 
fishermen generally have easy access. The fisheries 
are open to all who wish to exploit them and are 
owned by none" (Munro 1981). They tend to be 
recklessly used "because there are no private 
incentives to do otherwise" (Eagles 1984); "since 
fishermen do not own the fish until they have 
caught them, no individual fisherman can sensibly 
decide to refrain from fishing to allow the fish to 
grow and breed" (Victor 1979). Copes (198\) is 
even more explicit: 
"N 0 one fisherman is personally motivated to 
conserve the resource, for any fish he would 
return to the water to grow to larger size will 
likely end up in the nets of a rival fisherman. 
Any expense he would undertake to conserve or 
enhance thc fish stock, or to improve general 
fishery facilities, will yield him a negligible 
return. Most of the additions to the catch or 
improvements in returns that he would cause, 
will be enjoyed by other fishermen. When no 
individual is able to recoup an investment made 
in the fish stock, everyone will personally incline 
to neglect the future of the resource." 
One influential observer has categorised this 
the "tragedy of the commons ", to which he sees no 
technical solution, positing instead a moral solution 
(Hardin 1968) which has ben attacked in turn as 
politically fanciful and similarly incapable of con-
stituting a solution (Crowe 1969). Hardin's "traged y 
of the commons" has been applied to fishing and 
fish thus: 
"It is an important point of the Hardin paradigm 
that the decline comes about as the result of 
rational self-interest. Each new boat that a 
fisherman adds, brings him a gain of almost I. 
But as the effecs of over-fishing will be shared by 
all, his loss will be only a fraction of 1. Thus as a 
rational decision-maker, the only sensible course 
for him is to add another boat." (Berkes 1985) 
What is to be done? Many argue that the 
answer is to find ways ofturning common property 
rights into some form of private right (cf. Welch 
1983). In practice, as Harmon (1982) points out, 
once governments act to limit access to their fishing 
grounds, explicit or implicit property rights are 
established. A number of mechanisms for bestowing 
limited property rights which could protect the 
resource from over-exploitation exist. These could 
concentrate on industry outputs, in the form of a 
transferable quota system, whereby industry parti-
cipants are allotted catch quotas which can be 
bought and sold. Tasmanian strategies, as with the 
rest of the world, have concentrated rather on input 
strategies. Hence the limited entry policy adopted 
for the time being at least, in the Bass Strait fishery. 
Sturgess et al. (1982) argue that any successful 
management strategy must be a modification of 
this, for although "relatively blunt", "fishermen 
have come to accept it and, presumably, base their 
expectations on it continuing", whereas "radical 
departures from this scheme, such as an output tax 
or annual output quotas for individuals may be 
resisted by fishermen". Crutchfield (1980) agrees: 
"a limited entry program can be phased in so that it 
minimizes the compulsion that must be exerted to 
trim the level offishing to desired levels". There are 
difficulties however. As Meany( 1980) and Sturgess 
& Meany (1982) point out, it will have little effect 
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unless coupled to restrictions on upgrading the 
fishing capacity of those granted entry. Possibly 
even more significant are "the profound social and 
political decisions" which must be made "in relation 
to the establishment of a limited entry fishery: to 
which individuals in the society is the exclusive 
fishing entitlement to be given?" (Dragun 1981-82). 
No entirely satisfactory system of allocating licences 
has been devised, and the further danger exists 
that, once allocated, the industry becomes a closed 
shop. At a still more general level it is unlikely, on 
ideological grounds, that there could be consensus 
on any extension of property rights beyond that 
conferred by limited entry. Many would agree with 
Lowry's (1971) call for an affirmation that the 
world's bodies of water and the resources within 
them, are inalienable public property. 
Finally it has been suggested by Berkes 
(1985) that traditionally community-based con-
straints have successfully prevented over-fishing by 
utilizing a combination of territorial use rights and 
community moral sanctions to circumvent the 
"tragedy of the commons", and that herein lies the 
management solution to the future. Unfortunately, 
despite his sunny optimism, Berkes' evidence is 
curiously at odds with his argument: he notes the 
impossibility of such solutions in large-scale 
fisheries and that the impetus of technological 
change is antithetical to small-scale operations, 
and that in the market economy"economic relations 
tend to become free from the social framework" 
and hence beyond the control of informal com·· 
munity control mechanisms. Regrettably we must 
conclude that this seems an unpromising solution 
for the immediate and middle future. 
SUMMARY 
The history of Tasmania's scallop industry is 
one of recurring, unresolved problems, despite the 
periodic implementation of management initiatives. 
The factors contributing to this are complex and 
formidable: they are constitutional, political and 
bureaucratic, but they have still more to do with the 
biological and the common property natures of the 
resource, and with the failure to develop and apply 
satisfactory theoretical management models. Given 
that technological advances since the 1950's have 
greatly increased the industry's harvesting capacity, 
the need for effective management has been made 
much more acute. Political pressures can be 
expected to intensify as well, as entry into the 
industry becomes increasingly capital-intensive, 
and the financial consequences to individual 
fishermen of not having unrestrained access to the 
fishery are commensurately greater. Our conclusion 
is that management problems are likely to continue, 
largely for reasons which are endemic to the 
scallop's biology and resource-nature, and we 
should not unreasonably expect rapid progress 
towards resolution. 
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